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FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES:   
WHAT COLLECTIVE INTENTION TELLS US  
ABOUT CONGRESS AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
ABBY WRIGHT†
INTRODUCTION 
While courts in the United States frequently invoke legislative in-
tent and legislative purpose1 when interpreting statutes, legal scholars 
have long questioned whether a multimember body like Congress can 
have purposes or intentions.  Drawing on the philosophical literature 
on collective intention, this Comment argues that Congress, when en-
acting statutes, is the type of social organization that has intentions.  
The same literature on collective intention, however, counsels caution 
in expanding the list of mental states one should ascribe to Congress. 
This Comment begins by defining the contours of legislative in-
tent and legislative purpose and then explore why relying on legisla-
tive purpose is appealing to courts.  Next, the Comment describes a 
variety of theories of collective intention and looks in depth at the 
work of Raimo Tuomela.  Third, the Comment analyzes Congress’s 
characteristics as a social entity and applies Tuomela’s account of col-
lective intention to Congress, concluding that this account demon-
strates that Congress, at least under certain circumstances, can have 
intentions.  The argument runs as follows:  to be a member of Con-
gress an individual must agree that when legislation is being written, 
amended, and voted on certain members of Congress will become 
“operative” members.  Once a bill is passed, all members of Congress 
† J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2006; M.A. linguistics, 
University of California, Berkeley, 2002; B.A., Purdue University, 2000.  I would like to 
thank Professors Matthew Adler and Theodore Ruger for their insightful comments.  
In addition, I would like to thank Professor Stephen Burbank, Professor Cary 
Coglianese, J. Gordon Cooney, and David Castleman for their valuable suggestions.   I 
would also like to thank Morgan Taylor and Lauren Fox for excellent editing.  Finally, 
I want to thank my father for the title of this Comment.  All errors are my own. 
1 See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text for a description of the difference 
between legislative intent and legislative purpose as used in this Comment. 
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have an obligation to accept, at least weakly, that text as the group’s 
intention; the minority members of Congress have agreed to “give up 
their will with respect to group-binding group-goal formation [in this 
instance the text of the statute that was passed] and transfer that right 
to the operative members.”2
Finally, this Comment argues that while legislative purpose is an 
appealing tool for determining the scope of statutes, analyses using 
“legislative purpose” are misguided because the uniqueness and com-
plexity of Congress as a social group limits the application of theories 
of collective intention.3  Members of Congress cannot be said to have 
agreed in advance to accept the larger purposes and hopes that vari-
ous members of Congress might possess when enacting legislation.  
Therefore, when a judge purports to base a decision on legislative 
purpose, if the decision is to be justified, it must be supported by con-
siderations extrinsic to the legislative process and any theory of collec-
tive intention. 
I.  LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND PURPOSE IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
A.  Hibbs and Allapattah 
In the 2003 Term, a divided Supreme Court decided Hibbs v. 
Winn, 4 bringing the hotly contested concepts of legislative intent and 
legislative purpose to the fore.  The respondents in Hibbs challenged 
an Arizona law that provided a tax credit for contributions to organi-
zations awarding scholarships to children attending private, and pos-
sibly religious, schools.5  The issue before the Court was whether the 
Tax Injunction Act (TIA)6 prohibited a suit to enjoin a state tax credit 
of this kind.7  The TIA states that “district courts shall not enjoin, sus-
pend or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under 
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in 
2 RAIMO TUOMELA, THE IMPORTANCE OF US:  A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF BASIC 
SOCIAL NOTIONS 279 (1995). 
3 See infra note 177 and accompanying text (describing Congress as a group with a 
“complex and detailed division and specialization of labor”); infra Part IV.F (arguing 
that Congress has collective intention only to the point that “nonoperative members 
have some obligation to at least weakly accept the operative members’ jointly accepted 
intention”). 
4 542 U.S. 88 (2004). 
5 Id. at 94-95. 
 6  28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). 
7 Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 93. 
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the courts of such State.”8  The majority ultimately determined that 
the TIA did not bar such a suit because neither the word assessment 
nor the statute’s underlying purpose prohibited a suit where the re-
peal of the tax would increase the state’s finances. 
The Court began its analysis with a somewhat strained study of the 
language of the statute and determined that the term assessment has a 
“collection-propelling function.”9  Thus, according to the majority, a 
lessening of state tax burdens would not fall under the TIA’s terms 
because it would not be an assessment, levy, or collection of tax.  Cru-
cially, however, the Court went on to analyze the purpose of the TIA, 
concluding, in agreement with Judge Easterbrook,10 that § 1341’s pur-
pose was to “restrain state taxpayers from instituting federal actions to 
contest their liability for state taxes, but not to stop third parties from 
pursuing constitutional challenges to tax benefits in a federal fo-
rum.”11
Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, responded with a vigorous dis-
agreement over the meaning of assessment as used in the TIA. He 
stated that “an assessment . . . must at the least encompass the re-
cording of a taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability.”12  Thus,  enjoining the 
Arizona tax credit in question would affect the assessment of a state tax 
because it would alter the amount of tax recorded for the taxpayer.  
Justice Kennedy rejected the idea that the TIA’s purpose could have 
an independent, interpretive life of its own, stating that “the scope 
and purpose of the Act should be understood from its terms alone.”13  
Justice Kennedy further noted that an interpretation of the TIA as 
prohibiting any interference with state tax schemes “accords with the 
direct, broad, and unqualified language of the statute . . . . ‘[W]hen 
terms are unambiguous we may not speculate on probabilities of in-
tention.’”14  For Justice Kennedy, the words of the statute are what 
should determine its application; the broader legislative purpose of a 
statute should have no separate role in interpretation. 
8 28 U.S.C. § 1341. 
9 Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 102. 
10 See Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The legislative history . . . 
shows that § 1341 is designed to ensure that federal courts do not interfere with states’ 
collection of taxes, so long as the taxpayers have an opportunity to present to a court 
federal defenses to the imposition and collection of the taxes.”). 
11 Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 108. 
12 Id. at 115 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
13 Id. at 114. 
14 Id. at 126  (quoting Merchs’. Ins. Co. v. Ritchie, 72 U.S. 541, 545 (1866)). 
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While Justice Kennedy was in the minority in Hibbs, he wrote the 
majority opinion for a similar statutory interpretation case, Exxon Mo-
bil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.,15 decided quite recently.  The Alla-
pattah Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 “authorized supplemental ju-
risdiction over all claims by diverse parties arising out of the same 
Article III case or controversy.”16  Justice Kennedy reaffirmed his belief 
that “[e]xtrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only 
to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s 
understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.”17  The debate between 
majority and dissent, however, centered on the proper reading of the 
statute and not the role of legislative history and legislative purpose.18  
Only Justice Stevens’ dissent invoked the statute’s legislative history;19 
the main dissenting opinion did “not rely on the measure’s legislative 
history.”20  Thus, while Allapattah demonstrates the continuing debate 
over techniques of statutory interpretation, the actual issue was not, as 
in Hibbs, the validity of legislative purpose. 
For the respondents in Hibbs and Allapattah, the 5-4 decisions 
mean that one Justice’s theory of statutory interpretation determined 
the success of their claim.  These cases illustrate how divisive the de-
bates over the use of legislative intent and legislative purpose have be-
come.  While, as in Hibbs and Allapattah, the Justices opposed to the 
use of legislative purpose can be identified as the more conservative 
members of the Court, conservative positions are not necessarily 
aligned with a more restrictive understanding of statutory interpreta-
tion.21  Furthermore, Hibbs is but one example of a long line of cases 
15 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005). 
16 Id. at 2625. 
17 Id. at 2626. 
18 See id. at 2632 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (advocating a “narrower construction” 
of § 1367 than that employed by the majority). 
19 Id. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
20 Id. at 2641 n.14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
21 Compare Joint Brief of Industry Intervenor-Respondents at 2, Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14311 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2005) (No. 03-1361) (opposing 
broader regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and stating that the court should use 
the Clean Air Act’s “text, its overall structure, and legislative history” in interpreting 
the statute), with Final Brief for the Petitioners in Consolidated Cases at 13, Massachu-
setts v. EPA, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14311 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2005) (No. 03-1361) (sup-
porting regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and urging a reading of the Clean Air 
Act’s “plain language” when determining the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse 
gas emission standards). 
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where a majority has looked to legislative purpose22 to interpret a stat-
ute.23  The question remains, however, whether this use of legislative 
purpose (and even legislative intent) in statutory interpretation is jus-
tifiable.  Furthermore, the inquiry into whether such tools are justified 
presupposes that legislatures have intents or purposes. 
This Comment seeks to evaluate this claim:  that the nature of 
Congress as a social group is such that Congress has intents and pur-
poses.  Without a positive answer to this question, courts arguing from 
legislative intent or legislative purpose would only be masking other 
interpretive techniques (be they policy concerns, personal opinion, 
etc.) when they claim to be relying on a legislature’s state of mind.  
This Comment argues, based on theories of collective intention found 
in the philosophical literature, that a judge or court can sensibly speak 
of legislative intent in the narrow sense defined in Part II.A, but not of 
legislative purpose.  Being able to sensibly speak of legislative intent 
does not mean that a judge or court is necessarily justified in relying 
on legislative intent in statutory interpretation24 or that legislative in-
tent is necessarily determinable in every case; this Comment seeks 
only to answer the more limited question of whether Congress is the 
type of social group that makes “legislative intent” possible. 
B.  The Debate over Legislative Intent 
The use of legislative intent in statutory interpretation has long 
been controversial.  It has been attacked as impossible and unknow-
22 Although the Court in these cases sometimes uses the words “intend” or “in-
tent," the reasoning fits this Comment’s definition of legislative purpose.  See infra note 
41. 
23 See, e.g., Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 
590 (1995) (“In concluding that Congress did not authorize damages actions in state 
tax cases brought in federal court, we found no evidence that Congress intended § 
1983 to overturn the principle of federalism invoked in Dows and subsequently fol-
lowed by the courts.”); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989) 
(“Our conclusion that a State is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983 is rein-
forced by Congress’ purpose in enacting the statute. . . . Congress, in passing § 1983, 
had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity and to so alter 
the federal-state balance . . . .”); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 578 (1986) 
(“A rule of proportionality would make it difficult . . . for individuals with meritorious 
civil rights claims but relatively small potential damages to obtain redress from the 
courts.  This is totally inconsistent with Congress’ purpose in enacting § 1988.”); 
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979) (rejecting an interpretation 
of Title VII that would prohibit all affirmative action programs as contrary to the pur-
pose of the statute). 
24 For example, one could still argue that legislative intent is irrelevant or un-
democratic. 
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able25 and, even if possible, irrelevant26 to the task of statutory inter-
pretation.  Much recent literature, however, has defended the use of 
legislative intent in statutory interpretation.  Some literature has 
viewed questions of legislative intent in light of the nature of language 
itself 27 or the nature of our concepts about the actions of multi-
member organizations.28
25 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is elusive for a natural person, 
fictive for a collective body.”); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 
(1930), reprinted in LAW AND LANGUAGE 189, 196 (Frederick Shauer ed., 1993) (“A leg-
islature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two 
or three men drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which 
many of the approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, dif-
ferent ideas and beliefs.”); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”:  Legisla-
tive Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992) (“Individuals have in-
tentions and purpose and motives; collections of individuals do not.  To pretend 
otherwise is fanciful.”); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 16-21 (1994) (claiming not that legislative intent is never discoverable 
or always irrelevant, but rather arguing that actual congressional intent is almost always 
unknowable and conventional intent (i.e., what a given subgroup states is the intent of 
the legislature) is equally unhelpful because of the presence of vote counting, strategic 
behavior, and aggregation). 
26 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 25, at 197-98 (arguing that even if the intention of the 
legislature were determinable, it would be irrelevant for purposes of statutory interpre-
tation because it does not bind current interpreters, given that the legislature cannot 
be said to have performed the interpretation in advance). 
27 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?”:  
Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 982 (2004) 
(arguing that “recourse to intentions” is necessarily required for any interpretation of a 
text and, indeed, to identify a series of marks on a page as a text); Lawrence M. Solan, 
Private Language, Public Laws:  The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 434 (2005) (“[T]he distinction between the language of a statute 
and the intent of the legislature is largely a false one.”); Peter M. Tiersma, A Message in 
a Bottle:  Text, Autonomy, and Statutory Interpretation, 76 TUL. L. REV. 431, 440 (2001) 
(“Virtually any linguist would agree that the goal of interpretation is to determine what 
the . . . author intends to communicate to his audience.”). 
28 See, e.g., M.B.W. Sinclair, Legislative Intent:  Fact or Fabrication?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 1329, 1351-58 (1997) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1994)) (citing John Searle, Margaret Gilbert, and Michael Bratman 
for the proposition that legislative intent need not be the sum of individual intents in 
order to attack Eskridge’s dismissal of legislative intent); Solan, supra note 27, at 438-40 
(defending legislative intent with reference to the work of Margaret Gilbert and Mi-
chael Bratman); Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Su-
preme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 259-64 (applying John Searle’s philosophy of collec-
tive intention to account for the institutional intention of Congress); cf. Elizabeth S. 
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:  A General Restatement, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1503, 1514-27 (2000) (using Margaret Gilbert’s work on plural subjects to 
argue that the democratic state is a collective agent); Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional 
and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW  268, 283-84 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (claim-
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Although some of the literature supporting the use of legislative 
intent has styled itself as a response to textualism, a more moderate 
version of textualism need not exclude the use of legislative intent in 
statutory interpretation.29  Textualists take the position that “statutory 
text is the most determinate basis for statutory interpretation.”30  Even 
though the text may be the central focus of the interpretive task for a 
textualist, textualists arguably still recognize the role of legislative in-
tent, but simply seek to limit evidence of intent almost entirely to the 
text itself.31  Thus, the trend seems to be towards an acceptance of the 
necessity of legislative intent, even if in a much reduced form.32
Despite the recent warming to legislative intent, old doubts re-
main about the possibility of discerning intent when the intent in 
question must emanate from a group of persons, especially a group 
with as varied an array of aspirations, agendas, and motivations as 
Congress.33  These concerns are even more amplified with respect to 
ing that groups can have intents under certain conditions, but arguing that the real 
question is “whether judges should take into account the attitudes of legislators”). 
29 For a description of a very extreme form of textualism, see Alexander & 
Prakash, supra note 27, at 968, calling the “insistence that intentions play no role in the 
production of meaning . . . ‘intention free textualism.’”  Justice Scalia, in a recent arti-
cle, appears to approach this extreme.  See Antonin Scalia, Law & Language, FIRST 
THINGS, Nov. 2005, at 37, 43 (reviewing STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004)) 
(“Alice [in Wonderland] and I believe that words, like other conventional symbols, do 
convey meaning, an objective meaning, regardless of what their author ‘intends’ them 
to mean . . . .”). 
30 ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 38. 
31 See PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 127 (1999) (“To be more exact, textu-
alism claims that it does try to discover the intent of the legislature, but limits this in-
quiry to the text of the statute itself.”).  Tiersma elsewhere states that “[e]veryone 
should be a textualist sometimes,” arguing that limiting the interpretive task to the text 
may be appropriate for highly ‘autonomous’ legal texts.  Tiersma, supra note 27, at 
482. 
32 Even “strict” textualists and those who apparently reject legislative intent as un-
democratic or ontologically impossible rely on at least a restricted view of intention.  
For example, Justice Holmes wrote that “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature 
meant; we ask only what the statute means,” but earlier in the essay he had expressed 
that “we inquire what he meant in order to find out what he has said.”  Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899), reprinted in LAW 
AND LANGUAGE, supra note 25, at 185, 186-87.  While Judge Easterbrook has been, at 
times, skeptical of the existence of congressional intent, he seems to accept a kind of 
legislative intent which “informs a reading of a text, tells us its meaning.”  Easterbrook, 
supra note 25, at 64; see also Solan, supra note 27, at 453-58 (discussing examples from 
judicial opinions in which textualists resorted to using terms related to the intent of 
the legislature). 
33 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 16 (“That most members of Congress voted for a 
bill tells us little about what most members of Congress actually thought . . . . Problems 
with identifying the actual intent of individual legislators become overwhelming when 
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using legislative purpose to determine the meaning of a statute because 
legislative purpose requires inferences even further removed from the 
text of the statute.  Thus, this Comment examines both legislative in-
tent and legislative purpose in light of Congress’s nature as a social 
group. 
C.  The Argument 
As described above, serious doubts about the existence of legisla-
tive intent remain, despite a close to universal reliance on authorial 
intent to at least some degree in the interpretation of statutes.34  Fur-
thermore, while the Supreme Court frequently resorts to discussions 
of legislative purpose in interpreting statutes, many scholars do not 
believe legislative purpose is a justifiable technique of statutory inter-
pretation.35  Thus, the problem is the following:  Does the nature of Con-
gress as a social group combined with the properties of statutory text allow us to 
make inferences about Congress’s intent?  If so, does the same hold true for in-
ferences about Congress’s purpose? 
I argue that there is a plausible account of collective intention that 
can be fruitfully applied to Congress.  Although several recent legal 
articles have drawn on philosophical theories of collective action and 
intention,36 these articles have not examined the breadth of literature 
available.  Part II of this Comment defines the contours of legislative 
intent and purpose and explores why reliance on legislative purpose is 
so appealing.  Part III lays out the scope of theories on collective ac-
tion and intention.  Part IV argues that an account of collective inten-
tion that recognizes the complex structure of an organization in 
which certain members are authorized to set group goals suitably tied 
to the purpose of the group can plausibly support inferences regard-
ing Congress’s intent.  I further argue, however, that Congress cannot 
fulfill the requirements of a supraindividualist account of collective 
intention or an account that requires every participant to espouse the 
requisite intention.  The last section of Part IV further argues that 
while theories of collective intention demonstrate that ascertaining 
legislative intent is possible (at least in theory), the same cannot be 
these hard-to-figure individual intentions must be aggregated for each legislative 
chamber . . . .”); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty 
of knowing Congress’s intent). 
34 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
36 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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said of legislative purpose.  Thus, when a judge purports to base a de-
cision on legislative purpose, this decision must, in fact, be supported 
by considerations extrinsic to the legislative process and any infer-
ences that might be drawn therefrom. 
II.  LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE 
A.  Legislative Intent and Legislative Purpose 
Many scholars discuss two kinds of intent, distinguishing between 
either intended meaning and intended goals37 or specific intent and 
purpose.38  Other scholars and judges fail to delineate the contours of 
legislative intent at all.  While the distinction between intent and pur-
pose is by no means crystal clear, I take legislative intent to mean the 
narrow intent an author has when writing a text:  what message she 
hopes to communicate via the words chosen.  This view of intention 
makes use of what cognitive linguists have recognized as the conduit 
metaphor.39  The source domain, which is the primary field of real-
world experience from which the metaphor is drawn, is the world of 
physical objects that can be transferred between individuals; the target 
domain, the domain explained by the metaphor, is the world of men-
tal operations.40  In the conduit metaphor, words are the vehicles that 
transfer ideas between individuals.  The speaker places ideas into the 
words, while the hearer extracts the ideas from the words received.  
Thus, a legislator’s intent, in my sense, is the idea she sought to trans-
37 See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 27, app. at 994-95 (distinguishing 
“what to say to convey what one means” from “what that meaning would accomplish”). 
38 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 26 (“[A]n inquiry into legislative purpose is 
set at a higher level of generality than an inquiry into specific intentions . . . .”); 
Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 288 (“A crucial question about any approach to the 
meaning of a statute is how much weight to give to purposes, as contrasted with the 
language of particular provisions and indications of specific intent.”). 
39 See generally Michael J. Reddy, The Conduit Metaphor:  A Case of Frame Conflict in 
Our Language about Language, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 164 (Andrew Ortoney ed., 
2d ed. 1993) (analyzing the metaphor and providing an appendix with 141 examples 
of sentences using the metaphor); see also STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE 
FOREST:  LAW, LIFE AND MIND 52-53 (2001) (describing and mapping the metaphorical 
structure). 
40 See WINTER, supra note 39, at 52-53 (“In this conceptual mapping, a concept or 
idea is understood as an object subject to inspection, physical manipulation, and 
transportation . . . .”). 
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fer using the words she chose to speak.  In some ways, then, my defini-
tion of legislative intent is rather limited.41
Legislative purpose, on the other hand, I take to mean what a leg-
islator imagines or hopes will change about the world by means of en-
acting the legislation.42  This statement is not free from complication.  
Because the act of passing legislation changes something about the 
world and is a performative utterance,43 I mean legislative purpose to 
be something more than what Congress intends the direct effect of 
the legislation to be.  For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) awards fees to 
attorneys in civil rights cases.  Legislative intent, what Congress sought 
to communicate, would be the direct result that attorneys be awarded 
fees if representing a prevailing party.  In contrast, legislative purpose 
might be to increase the number of attorneys willing to take civil 
rights cases.  Thus, legislative purpose is a secondary effect the statute 
seeks to bring about. 
Both legislative intent and legislative purpose in my sense are dis-
tinguishable from what Judge Easterbrook has called “raw intent”—
that is, intent without any law, meaning that a “law” could be enforced 
if it comported with a legislative purpose that had no instantiation in 
an actual statute.44  This is, however, no longer a serious contender as 
an interpretive theory.45
Like the debate over legislative intent, scholars disagree over 
whether legislative purpose may be taken into account during statu-
tory interpretation.46  Many scholars argue that legislative purpose 
41 What evidence one may use to determine what meaning the legislators hoped 
the words would carry is a separate question, and one this Comment does not try to 
answer. 
42 This is similar to a distinction made in Sinclair, supra note 28, at 1356. 
43 See infra note 182 and accompanying text (arguing that the structure of a stat-
ute, combined with the words chosen by its authors, is a speech act that has a “perfor-
mative” impact on its subjects). 
44 Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 64-65. 
45 The Supreme Court stated unanimously in P.R. Department of Consumer Affairs v. 
Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 501 (1988), that “unenacted approvals, beliefs, and 
desires are not laws,” reversing the court of appeals.  Thus, the lower court’s approval 
of such an approach seems to be an outlier. 
46 Compare HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:  BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1125 (1994) (“The first task in the 
interpretation of any statute (or any provision of a statute) is to determine what purpose ought to 
be attributed to it.  The principal problem in the development of a workable technique 
of interpretation is the formulation of . . . acceptable criteria for the attribution of 
purpose.”), with Alexander & Prakash, supra note 27, app. at 994-95 (arguing in favor 
of intentionalists who “only advocate[] honoring the intent of the lawmaker at the spe-
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should not be taken into account because it is too far removed from 
the actual words enacted by the legislature,47 even though the Su-
preme Court still embraces legislative purpose48 quite frequently.49
B.  Why Legislative Purpose Is Appealing 
While it is not my goal to describe statutory construction itself in 
any detail in this Comment, I would like to briefly describe why and 
when the use of legislative purpose is particularly attractive.  This sup-
ports the argument that it is crucial to determine whether a determi-
nation of legislative purpose, in addition to legislative intent, is possi-
ble. 
First, it is important to understand the linguistic concepts involved 
in creating and interpreting legislation.  Statutory construction in 
hard cases is an act of conceptual categorization.  Linguists such as 
Charles Fillmore and George Lakoff have spent decades analyzing the 
conceptual structures that explain and motivate our use and under-
standing of language.  Professor Fillmore’s analysis has taken the form 
of frame semantics : 
Frame semantics offers a particular way of looking at word mean-
ings . . . . [T]he term ‘frame’ [means] . . . any system of concepts related 
in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to under-
stand the whole structure in which it fits . . . . 
. . . [W]ords represent categorizations of experience, and each of 
these categories is underlain by a motivating situation occurring against 
a background of knowledge and experience.50
cific level of generality that the lawmaker meant to convey, even if at that level it 
thwarts the lawmaker’s more general intentions”). 
47 Furthermore, the use of legislative purpose might be argued to be undemo-
cratic since laws are passed by elected representatives, while purposes are most often 
not part of the codified law.  Thus, some have argued that if, but only if, laws were 
handed down by a dictator, her purpose in passing such laws would be relevant.  See 
Holmes, supra note 32, at 187 (“If supreme power resided in the person of a despot 
who would cut off your hand or your head if you went wrong, probably one would take 
every available means to find out what was wanted.”). 
48 Here I mean legislative purpose as I have described; as described supra note 22, 
the Court sometimes labels this Congress’s intention.  These intentions are purposes in 
my sense:  they are related to the goals and objectives a statute can be said to support. 
49 See supra note 23 (pointing to decisions in which the Supreme Court relied on 
congressional purpose). 
50 Charles J. Fillmore, Frame Semantics, in LINGUISTICS IN THE MORNING CALM 111, 
111-12 (Linguistic Soc’y of Korea ed., 1982).  For the most recent work on frame se-
mantics and a bibliography of works using the theory, see Framenet,  
http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/~framenet (last visited Jan. 18, 2006). 
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One example of work in cognitive linguistics relevant to statutory 
interpretation is Professor Fillmore’s analysis of the term orphan.51  
Professor Fillmore argues that orphan must be analyzed against the 
background of a culture in which children depend on their parents 
for support.  Thus, the category of orphan “does not have ‘built into it’ 
any specification of the age after which it is no longer relevant to 
speak of somebody as an orphan”; rather, this is understood through 
the background information, or frame, of relationships between par-
ents and children in a particular culture.52  In his analysis, Professor 
Fillmore points to the old joke where a child on trial for murdering 
his parents asks the court to be lenient because he is now an orphan.  
Given the frame in which orphan is situated, a person cannot “orphan” 
herself.53  As Professor Fillmore’s orphan example illustrates: 
The descriptive framework . . . is one in which words . . . are seen as in-
dexing semantic or cognitive categories which are themselves recognized 
as participating in larger conceptual structures of some sort, all of this 
made intelligible by knowing something about the kinds of settings or 
contexts in which a community found a need to make such categories 
available to its participants . . . .54
Professor Lakoff’s analysis has described the meaning of concepts 
in terms of radial categories.55  Radial categories are highly structured 
conceptual groupings with prototypical, salient, or ideal members 
forming the center of the category and more peripheral members be-
ing judged as members of the category to a lesser degree.56  Radial 
categories have a complex internal structure with connections of dif-
ferent types existing between members of the category.57
Reflecting on Lakoff’s and Fillmore’s linguistic analyses, two situa-
tions emerge where statutory construction seems to require legislative 
(or rule-making) purpose.  The first is when a judge must decide what 
51 See Fillmore, supra note 50, at 118 (using the orphan example to demonstrate 
“the complexity of fit between uses of [a] word and real world situations to be attrib-
uted to the details of the prototype background frame rather than to the details of the 
word’s meaning”); see also WINTER, supra note 39, at 85-87 (discussing Fillmore’s analy-
sis of bachelor). 
52 Fillmore, supra note 50, at 118. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 119. 
55 GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS:  WHAT CATEGORIES 
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 68-135 (1987). 
56 Id. at 65, 91. 
57 See WINTER, supra note 39, at 89-92 (drawing on LAKOFF, supra note 55), for an 
interesting discussion of the complexities of the category mother. 
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the boundaries of a particular category are, in a context in which the 
legislature or rule-making body clearly had no intent with respect to a 
new object or event. 
For example, in Mead Corp. v. United States58 the court had to de-
termine whether a day planner fit within the category described by 
Section 4820.10.20 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United 
States:  “[d]iaries, notebooks and address books, bound; memorandum 
pads, letter pads and similar articles.”59  This was not, properly speak-
ing, a debate that could be won by determining the “proper” meaning 
of day planner.  Rather it was a debate over the boundaries of the con-
cepts diary and bound.  In this case it would have been extremely useful 
to know the purpose for which the category had been created:  Why 
did the agency exempt some materials from tariff? 
This question mirrors Professor Fillmore’s statement of what is 
necessary to understand the term orphan.  Categories take on the 
structure they do precisely because they relate to some goal or pur-
pose of the language community:  why “a community found a need to 
make such categories available to its participants.”60
In terms of radial categories, the agency’s purpose would tell us 
whether day planners should be within the radial category whose cen-
tral or prototypical member is diary.  The purpose the agency had in 
enacting the tariff could alert a court to the inner structure of the 
category and whether that structure extends the categories to include 
day planners.  The agency’s purpose would in this way tell a court why 
the members of the category have been placed in the category—that 
is, what internal structure holds them together?  Thus, it is only natu-
ral to turn to the purpose of the legislation (or, as in this case, the 
rule-making agency) as a guide to determining whether a particular 
object or event falls within a given category. 
The second situation where Lakoff’s and Fillmore’s work provides 
insight is one in which two possible categorizations of a concept con-
flict.  Such was the case in determining the meaning of enterprise in Na-
tional Organization for Women v. Scheidler; the Court had to determine if 
an antiabortion group was an enterprise as defined by the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) in order to deter-
mine whether the group could be liable for its activities.61  The Court 
58 185 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999), rev’d in part, United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218 (2001). 
59 Id. at 1306-10 (emphasis added). 
60 Fillmore, supra note 50, at 119. 
61 510 U.S. 249, 250, 256-61 (1994). 
  
996 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 983 
 
did not require an enterprise to have an economic purpose and, thus, 
held that Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) could, in theory, be an en-
terprise for purposes of RICO.62
Following the case, three linguists and a law professor devised an 
experiment to determine whether the Court’s interpretation matched 
that of English speakers.63  This experiment revealed two groups of 
speakers:  those who required an enterprise to have a profit-seeking or 
economic goal and those who only required some sort of organiza-
tional goal.64  These two conceptualizations of enterprise correspond to 
the debate in the courts; understanding more about the purposes of 
those who enacted RICO would shed light on which categorization 
should be selected and, more specifically, given Congress’s purpose in 
enacting RICO, whether PLAN should fit within the category of enter-
prise. 
As has been demonstrated, using legislative purpose to determine 
the scope of a regulation or statute is highly appealing in difficult 
cases that require an extension of a concept or a choice between two 
competing conceptualizations.  The question remains, however, 
whether the use of legislative purpose can ever be justified given the 
problems of ascribing purpose to multi-member organizations such as 
Congress. 
III.  THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE INTENTION65
“In the last decade, philosophy has seen a burgeoning interest in 
the social world—in the nature of social relations, social entities, and 
sociality itself.”66  Consistent with this expanding analysis of the social 
world, this Part describes the most significant work in the burgeoning 
field of collective intention.  Part III.A provides a general overview of 
the approaches used by scholars in this area; Parts III.B-D explores the 
62 Id. at 262. 
63 Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561 
(1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993)). 
64 Id. at 1595. 
65 Although I use Searle’s term of collective intention, see John R. Searle, Collective 
Intentions and Actions, in INTENTIONS IN COMMUNICATION 401, 401 (Philip R. Cohen et 
al. eds., 1990), I do so neutrally. 
66 Frederick F. Schmitt, Socializing Metaphysics:  An Introduction, in SOCIALIZING 
METAPHYSICS:  THE NATURE OF SOCIAL REALITY 1, 1 (Frederick F. Schmitt ed., 2003); 
see also, e.g., Christopher Kutz, The Collective Work of Citizenship, 8 LEGAL THEORY 471, 
472 (2002) (“Clearly, liberal theory’s dependence on an individualistic conception of 
agency comes at the cost of significant distortion of the actual framework of social life, 
which is so often essentially collective.”). 
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work of Raimo Tuomela, Margaret Gilbert, and Philip Pettit, respec-
tively. 
A.  An Overview of Collective Intention 
The study of collective intention is the study of whether and how 
groups form intentions.67  While what it means for an individual to 
have an intention may not itself be free from controversy, the subject 
becomes even more fraught with difficulty when groups of individuals 
are considered.  Clearly, speakers of English speak as if groups are en-
tities capable of intentions and actions.  For example, it is perfectly 
natural to speak of a club planning an event or a company designing a 
new product.  Although both describe situations which require more 
than one individual to perform separate actions, it seems quite felici-
tous to speak of the organization as working as a unit toward a collec-
tive goal. 
In providing an overview of theories of collective intention, the 
first distinction to be made is between individualist accounts of collec-
tive intention and nonindividualist, or holistic, accounts.  While it is 
virtually undisputed that the actions of individuals determine the exis-
tence and nature of social collectivities (social groups supervene on an 
individual’s actions),68 the dispute over individualism centers on 
whether group intentions can be reduced to individual intentions.69  
When an individual claims that a group intends to do something, does 
this just mean that each individual within the group has the proper 
intention? 
Individualist accounts, such as Seumas Miller’s account, describe 
joint action as the sum of individual actions “directed to the realisa-
tion of a collective end.”70  The collective end must also be each indi-
67 For a good exposition of the literature, see Schmitt, supra note 66, at 1-37, and 
MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY:  NEW ESSAYS IN PLURAL SUBJECT 
THEORY 154-61 (2000). 
68 See Schmitt, supra note 66, at 2 (“[S]ocial relations and collectivities are deter-
mined by individuals and their nonsocial properties [in that] social relations and collec-
tivities supervene on nonsocial properties of individuals.”). 
69 An eliminative individualist, however, would deny the existence of social groups 
entirely.  See id. at 6-7 (describing the theory of eliminative ontological individualsm).  
Schmitt’s own theory of group intention is eliminativist; he concludes that joint action 
requires a supraindividualist account (that groups are themselves intentional subjects 
on par with individuals) which, in turn, prohibits the existence of any such groups.  
Frederick F. Schmitt, Joint Action:  From Individualism to Supraindividualism, in 
SOCIALIZING METAPHYSICS, supra note 66, at 129, 156. 
70 SEUMAS MILLER, SOCIAL ACTION:  A TELEOLOGICAL ACCOUNT 57 (2001). 
  
998 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 983 
 
vidual’s desired outcome.71  In addition to the actions performed by 
each individual, the participants in the joint actions must hold certain 
beliefs about the other participant’s actions.72
Michael Bratman holds a similar view, which is “broadly individu-
alistic in spirit.”73  Bratman begins his discussion of shared intention 
with the observation that a shared intention requires more than two 
individuals with identical intentions.74  If you and I both intend to 
paint the house independently of the other’s actions or intentions, we 
cannot properly be said to have a shared intention.  Shared intention 
is “a state of affairs consisting primarily of appropriate attitudes of 
each individual participant and their interrelations,”75 in which each 
individual holds an intention that the group behave in a certain way 
coupled with the appropriate reflexivity of belief.76  This state of af-
fairs allows the coordinated activity and planning that characterizes a 
social group.77  For Bratman, the shared intention is not an attitude; it 
is a state of affairs. 
In Bratman’s view, a shared intention means that I intend that we J.  
But how can “I intend our activity?”78  The difficulty is that two indi-
viduals must come jointly to intend something where both seemingly 
have the exclusive power to settle the collective course of action.  
Bratman responds by recognizing a kind of “temporal asymmetry”79 
wherein, for example, I form the intention that we J on the assump-
tion that this will cause you to also come to intend that we J.  “[Y]ou 
and I each might arrive at intentions that we J as part of a web of in-
tentions . . . .”80  I realize that you are free to not intend that we J, but 
predict that you will and base my intention on that prediction.  Thus, 
71 Id. at 57-58. 
72 See id. at 59 (“[C]ollective ends include mutual true belief.”). 
73 MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION:  SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION 
AND AGENCY 129 (1999). 
74 Id. at 110-11. 
75 Id. at 111. 
76 Note that Bratman does not claim that his conditions are necessary for all types 
of shared intention, but that this is a coherent view.  See id. at 160 (“[M]y concern here 
[has been] . . . to defend the coherence of [my] conditions as at least constituting an 
important kind of shared intention.”). 
77 See id. at 140 (describing “a social-psychological web of interlocking attitudes” as 
part of a strategy to defend the shared intention thesis). 
78 Id. at 145. 
79 Id. at 157. 
80 Id. (italics added). 
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the shared intention is “up to each of us.”81  Finally, Bratman posits a 
special kind of group activity called “shared cooperative activity.”82
Unlike Miller and Bratman, both of whom are clearly individual-
ists, Raimo Tuomela’s work is less clearly individualistic.  While Mar-
garet Gilbert ascribes an individualistic account to Raimo Tuomela,83 
Frederick Schmitt argues that Tuomela’s “we-mode” is not reducible 
to individual attitudes.84  Tuomela seems to accept, however, the idea 
that phenomena can be explained in individualistic terms85 and as-
cribes to an ontological individualism.86  Regardless, his “conceptual 
framework . . . is compatible with doctrines postulating the existence 
of social wholes.”87
The second set of collective intention theories can be character-
ized as nonindividualist.  For these philosophers, “[c]ollective inten-
tional behavior is a primitive phenomenon that cannot be analyzed as 
just the summation of individual intentional behavior.”88  John Searle 
and Margaret Gilbert are two proponents of nonindividualism.  As an 
example, Searle contrasts two situations:  one in which a person is 
running towards a shelter in a park to avoid a sudden rainstorm; the 
other in which a person is running towards the same point as part of 
an outdoor ballet.  From an external point of view, both actions may 
appear identical.89  In the first case, “it seems no set of intends, even 
supplemented with beliefs about other I intends, is sufficient to get to 
the we intend.”90  Furthermore, in the second case, the I intend is de-
rivative from the we intend; individual intentions derived from collec-
tive intentions may have different content from the collective inten-
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 106.  Bratman describes the features of shared cooperative action as in-
cluding mutual responsiveness (of both intention and action), commitment to the 
joint activity, and commitment to mutual support.  Id. at 94-95.  He also notes that 
shared cooperative action is “cooperatively neutral” in that “joint performance of an 
act . . . may be cooperative, but it need not be.”  Id. at 96-97.  Examples of cooperative 
acts include painting a house or shoveling snow from a sidewalk, as opposed to partici-
pating in a competitive endeavor such as chess. 
83 GILBERT, supra note 67, at 159. 
84 Schmitt, supra note 66, at 14. 
85 See TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 361-63 (discussing conceptual individualism). 
86 See id. at 367 (“While I accept the ‘intentional existence’ of social wholes, viz., 
that concepts of social wholes can and do exist in people’s thoughts, they have no real 
existence, viz., existence outside the realm of thoughts.”). 
87 Id. at 376. 
88 Searle, supra note 65, at 401. 
89 Id. at 403. 
90 Id. (italics added). 
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tion.91  We-intentions, for Searle, contain a notion of cooperation92 and, 
while residing solely in the mind of the individual, make reference to 
the collective.  The individual will have the intention:  “I am doing act 
B as part of our doing act A.”93
Similarly, Gilbert’s account invokes the notion of a “joint com-
mitment” that “is not a conjunction of the personal commitments of 
the various parties but the commitment of all.”94  Furthermore, she 
argues that “people share an intention if and only if they are jointly 
committed to espouse a certain intention as a body.”95
A further distinction can be made between internally and exter-
nally holistic (or nonindividualist) theories.96  An internal holist’s ac-
count of shared or collective intention requires only that the partici-
pants in the action see the action as being an action of the group of 
which they are a member.97  Gilbert, in contrast, is an external holist 
because her account “irreducibly ascribes” the action in question to a 
group of individuals.98  To form a plural subject properly, individuals 
must jointly intend; it is not enough that each individual believe she is 
acting collectively or possess an intention collectively. 
Unlike Gilbert, Searle is an internal holist; under his account it is 
the participants who ascribe the action to the group.99  In contrast to 
Bratman’s individualist theory, Searle’s theory is not an account of a 
state of affairs; it is an account of a certain kind of intention that an 
individual mind possesses.  What allows us to have collective inten-
tions is a background belief that other individuals are like ourselves 
and have a similar awareness of our agent status and that we view each 
other as possible collective agents.100  Thus, in contrast to Gilbert’s ex-
ternal holist view (and Bratman’s individualist view), Searle’s account 
will hold “even if [the participant is] a brain in a vat” and completely 
91 Id.  For example, the collective intention may be to bake a cake, but the indi-
vidual, derivative intention may be that I will crack the eggs and put them into the bat-
ter. 
92 See id. at 406 (“The notion of a we-intention, of collective intentionality, implies 
the notion of cooperation.”). 
93 Id. at 407. 
94 GILBERT, supra note 67, at 158. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 157. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 157-58. 
99 See Searle, supra note 65, at 402-03 (describing how actions take on a new char-
acter based on an individual’s perceptions). 
100 See id. at 414 (“Collective intentionality . . . presupposes a sense of others as 
more than mere conscious agents . . . .”). 
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mistaken as to whether the collective intention is shared.101  In such a 
case, not only will an individual hold a mistaken belief about the col-
lective intention, but she will also be mistaken as to what she is do-
ing.102
The final variety of collective intention is supraindividualism.  
Philip Pettit advocates a kind of supraindividualism for “certain collec-
tivities . . . [which are] subjects in their own right, giving them a way of 
being minded that is starkly discontinuous with the mentality of their 
members.”103  Pettit’s account does not conflict with the requirement 
that collectivities must supervene on individual actions; it merely says 
that once certain collectivities come into existence, they “assume a life 
of their own . . . displaying all the qualities expected in personal 
agents.”104
Most philosophers of collective intention have focused primarily 
on small groups, often with just two members.105  I now go on to de-
scribe in more detail the work of the three philosophers who most 
clearly address the intricacies of structured social groups and whose 
work holds the most potential to be fruitfully applied to Congress:  
Raimo Tuomela, Margaret Gilbert, and Philip Pettit.  Because of the 
particular complexities that Congress poses for these theories, this 
Part highlights the work of philosophers of collective intention who 
have focused on the intention forming of larger groups. 
B.  Raimo Tuomela 
Tuomela’s account of collective intention makes a fundamental 
“distinction between the notions of having an attitude or acting as a 
group member versus as a private person.”106  These he calls the “we-mode” 
and the “I-mode.”107  The notion of joint intention, for Tuomela, re-
quires the “we-mode” and “we-intentions.”  Tuomela defines we-
101 Id. at 407, 414. 
102 Id. at 408. 
103 Philip Pettit, Groups with Minds of Their Own, in SOCIALIZING METAPHYSICS, supra 
note 66, at 167, 167. 
104 Id. at 191. 
105 See ANNETTE C. BAIER, THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 26 (1997) (“Yet when re-
cent philosophers such as John Searle and Michael Bratman have turned their atten-
tion to collective intention and collective action, they have chosen pairs of persons, 
and so have seen the collective intention as no more than the coordination of two in-
dividuals’ intentions.”). 
106 Raimo Tuomela, The We-Mode and the I-Mode, in SOCIALIZING METAPHYSICS, su-
pra note 66, at 93, 93. 
107 Id. 
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intentions thus:  “A we-intends to bring about X [if and only if] A 
shares the (agreement-based) intention to bring about X and believes 
that this intention to bring about X is shared in G and believes that it 
is mutually believed that this intention is shared in G . . . .”108  A more 
recent formulation introduces the idea of the group’s “collective ac-
ceptance” of the intention in place of the mutual belief:  “[I]f a group 
collectively accepts something as its view, it binds itself to this view and 
this involves a kind of group pressure . . . .”109  Furthermore, this for-
mulation of the central we-mode requires that an individual is func-
tioning as a group member and is committed to the action at least in 
part because of the group.110  To function as a group member is to “in-
tentionally attempt to act in a way related to . . . the group’s realm of 
concern such that [it] does not violate the group’s central, constitu-
tive goals, beliefs, standards, and norms . . . .”111
Joint intentions, for Tuomela in The Importance of Us,112 require the 
making of an agreement.113  This agreement need not be a recurring 
agreement.  Tuomela argues that “especially in institutionalized social 
settings . . . there can be standing joint intentions (policies) which are 
activated in suitable circumstances but which do not presuppose re-
newed intention-formation or renewed agreement-making.”114  These 
“standing joint intentions” rely on social norms which participants en-
ter into when they join the institution in question. 
Building on this relaxed notion of agreement, Tuomela further 
refines his definition of a we-intention.  Tuomela discusses types of 
joint action, including “noncooperative joint action” where partici-
pants cooperate only in so much as they fulfill their agreement.115  
The participants do not help the other participants move fully towards 
their goals; rather, the “agents act on their part-related preferences 
(utilities) built into the structure of the action.”116
108 TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 38 (italics added). 
109 Tuomela, supra note 106, at 103. 
110 Id. at 104. 
111 Id. at 100. 
112 The book is a highly complex and intricate work, which I have attempted to 
summarize (and simplify) here.  For a more recent exploration of these issues, see 
RAIMO TUOMELA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL PRACTICES:  A COLLECTIVE ACCEPTANCE 
VIEW (2002). 
113 TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 74. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 149. 
116 Id. 
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Finally, Tuomela discusses the idea of group goals, which in turn 
amount to group intentions.117  Understanding group intentions re-
quires separating “operative” from “nonoperative” members of a 
group.  Operative members are those members whose actions lead to 
group action or those whose actions set the intentions for the 
group.118
Tuomela gives the example of a state which intends to form a 
peace treaty.  The appropriate collective members may draft the treaty 
and sign it; these are the operative members.  While most citizens 
have done nothing to directly participate, the state can act as a collec-
tive whole if the citizens were in some way obliged to accept the offi-
cials acting on their behalf.119  “The nonoperative members may dis-
agree with the goal formed for G, but typically they can still be 
assumed to conform to what the operative members do, and in this 
sense to ‘tacitly’ or ‘weakly’ accept their joint goals as valid goals of 
G.”120  According to Tuomela, there is at least a prima facie duty on 
the part of the nonoperative members to accept these goals when they 
are acting within a structured social group where the operative mem-
bers are acting within the relevant authority system.121  This formula-
tion is “compatible with there being nonoperative members who even 
qua members of G disagree with the . . . goals of the operational 
members.”122
C.  Margaret Gilbert 
As described in Part A, Margaret Gilbert can be characterized as 
an external holist.123  Gilbert proposes three criteria of adequacy for a 
117 Id. at 285. 
118 Id. at 273-74. 
119 Id.  It is debatable, of course, whether citizens would be obliged to accept the 
decision.  See generally Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611 (1991) 
(examining the foundations of legal authority).  Note also that operative members vary 
from group task to group task.  TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 274. 
120 TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 276 (italics added). 
121 Id. at 281. 
122 Id (italics added). 
123 It seems that Gilbert sees her task as primarily conceptual.  See Margaret Gil-
bert, What Is It for Us To Intend?, in 2 CONTEMPORARY ACTION THEORY 65, 66 (Ghita 
Holmstrom-Hintikka & Raimo Tuomela eds., 1997) (“What is it for us to share an in-
tention?  In this essay I propose an answer to this question.  I take the question to call 
for an analysis of the everyday concept of a shared intention.”).  At points, she appears 
to be making ontological claims:  “people form a plural subject of X-ing if they are 
jointly committed to X as a body.”  GILBERT, supra note 67, at 158.  As Gilbert writes in 
On Social Facts, “[g]iven that it is clear what plural subjects amount to, one can decide 
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shared intention:  obligation, the view that whenever one understands 
a shared intention to exist, one also understands an obligation to ful-
fill one’s end; permission, the view that a participant in a shared in-
tention is understood to require the permission of the other to 
change the plan; and “compatibility with lack of the corresponding 
personal intentions,” which is the view that a shared intention does 
not require a matching personal intention.124
A shared intention, for Gilbert, requires a plural subject that 
comes into being when individuals are jointly committed to perform-
ing some action as a body.  For shared intention, this means that the 
individuals are jointly committed to intending as a body.125  Intending 
as a body is “all acting in such a way as to constitute a body that” in-
tends.126  Joint commitment means a commitment of two or more peo-
ple; a joint commitment is not the sum of two personal commitments, 
but a holistic commitment held by two or more people that results in 
dependent individual commitments.127  A joint commitment comes 
into being when the participants exhibit “matching expressions of per-
sonal readiness to enter a particular joint commitment.”128  The shared in-
tention provides a single motivating force for all the individuals, and, 
thus, personal intentions would be redundant.129
In On Social Facts, Gilbert notes that for some actions and types of 
groups (for example, one country invading another) certain represen-
tatives can “speak for” the entire group.  This works when “members 
of the group jointly accept that certain decisions of a certain few are 
to count as our decisions.”130  Furthermore, Gilbert discusses how a 
group can jointly accept a particular principle, while individuals may 
still diverge in their personal views: 
on their reality in the light of one’s own ontological preferences.”  MARGARET 
GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 432 (1989).  After giving the example of seeing two people 
chatting and claiming they are a plural subject: 
I take it that they have . . . the concept of a plural subject.  Why should one 
deny of them that once they have fulfilled the conditions, they constitute such 
a subject?  The only reason I can see, is if one has an ontology which is more 
or less restricted to stones. 
Id. at 433. 
124 Gilbert, supra note 123, at 67-69. 
125 Id. at 71-72. 
126 GILBERT, supra note 67, at 54. 
127 Margaret Gilbert, The Structure of the Social Atom, in SOCIALIZING METAPHYSICS, 
supra note 66, at 39, 49-50; see also GILBERT, supra note 67, at 53. 
128 Gilbert, supra note 127, at 54. 
129 Gilbert, supra note 123, at 77-78. 
130 GILBERT, supra note 123, at 206 (internal reference omitted). 
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One is required to express the jointly accepted view only in the appro-
priate circumstances. . . . 
. . . [O]ne may be able to carry out the obligations inherent in one’s 
joint acceptance of a principle while not only personally endorsing a 
contrary principle, but actually conforming to a personal principle at 
certain times. 131
Under this view, then, the joint commitment to act or believe in a 
certain way is not undermined by contrary personal views, as long as 
the individual has jointly accepted the view. 
D.  Philip Pettit 
In some ways, Pettit’s account of shared intention can be seen as 
the most extreme.  He argues that certain collectivities “assume a life 
of their own . . . displaying all the qualities expected in personal 
agents.”132  This view may be described as ontological supraindividual-
ism.133  Pettit begins his article by discussing a paradox that can arise 
in group decision making.134  Most such decisions are conclusion-
centered in that individual votes are taken on the final result; how-
ever, it may be the case that counting each individual’s vote on each 
portion of the decision (acting premise-centered) will lead to a differ-
ent result.135  Pettit also describes a diachronic version of the problem 
where a group must decide whether to base their decision on the cur-
rent issue or on premises culled from their prior decisions.136  As Pettit 
views it, groups face a choice:  they may respond to individual views, 
running the risk of being inconsistent over time, or they may choose 
to reason as a collective “even where that means compromising re-
sponsiveness to the views of individual members.”137
131 Id. at 375. 
132 Pettit, supra note 103, at 191. 
133 See Schmitt, supra note 66, at 15 (describing ontological supraindividualism as 
“the view that the entities that we are talking about when we speak of groups . . . in fact 
exist”). 
134 Pettit, supra note 103, at 168-72. 
135 For example, Pettit describes a tort action decided by three judges.  While only 
one judge might find both causation and duty of care (and, therefore, liability), a ma-
jority of the judges might believe the defendant’s actions caused the harm and a ma-
jority might also believe there was a duty of care.  Id. at 168.  Pettit bases this example 
on the argument in Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 
YALE L.J. 82, 115 (1986). 
136 Pettit, supra note 103, at 172-73. 
137 Philip Pettit, Collective Persons and Powers, 8 LEGAL THEORY 443, 450 (2002). 
  
1006 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 983 
 
“[P]urposive groups,” as Pettit describes them, are groups that 
“coordinate their actions around the pursuit of a common purpose” 
and these groups will have to make decisions about how they are to 
act.138  Over the course of its existence, a group or organization will 
make decisions about courses of action and will build up a record of 
such decisions.  These past decisions will constrain the future actions 
of the group; the group will eventually confront the dilemma de-
scribed above:  they will have to decide whether to act consistently 
with their past decisions.139  Many organized groups will choose to con-
form with past decisions in order to project an image of consistency.  
These groups “that collectivize reason,” he argues, “deserve ontologi-
cal recognition as intentional and personal subjects.”140  Pettit calls 
these social integrates.141
According to Pettit, social integrates can be considered inten-
tional subjects because they “display all the functional marks of an in-
tentional subject.”142  The group will “generally act in a manner that is 
rationalized by independently discernible representations and 
goals . . . . [I]t will display the degree of constancy as well as the de-
gree of coherence that we expect in any intentional subject.”143  Pettit 
goes on to claim that social integrates are institutional persons capable 
of being held to task for inconsistency in judgments and intentions.144
Having summarized the most influential thinkers and accounts in 
collective intention, I now turn to how their accounts may be fruitfully 
applied to the social group in question:  Congress.  I first examine the 
nature of Congress as a social group and which, if any, of the above 
accounts allow us to infer shared intentions on the part of Congress.  
Section IV.F then considers the limits of these inferences in terms of 
the scope of mental states attributable to Congress. 
138 Pettit, supra note 103, at 176. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 175. 
141 Id. at 178. 
142 Id. at 182.  Note that Pettit’s account does not address the nature, if any, of the 
shared intention or subjecthood of a group which fails to meet his criteria for social 
integrate. 
143Id.  See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 135, at 116-17, for a discussion of consis-
tency versus coherence. 
144 Pettit, supra note 103, at 185. 
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IV.  CONGRESS AND COLLECTIVE INTENTION 
Congress as a social group145 poses particular problems for a the-
ory of collective intention.  Because it is beyond the scope of this 
Comment to argue effectively for or against one of the approaches to 
collective intention described in Part III on a rigorous philosophical 
basis,146 my argument here is the more limited one:  that despite Con-
gress’s complexity, a theory of Congress as an intentional entity is 
plausible using at least one account of collective intention.  First, I re-
view several prior attempts in the legal literature to defend legislative 
intent using theories of collective intention.  Then, I put forth my 
positive argument for why legislative intent is possible:  why Congress 
can be said to be an entity with intentions.147
A.  Previous Defenses of Legislative Intent 
Lawrence Solan, in Private Language, Public Laws:  The Central Role 
of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, argues effectively that 
speaking of legislative intent is a coherent and virtually unavoidable 
thing for judges to do.148  Even in a case where almost no legislator 
had an intention toward the legislation that was passed, a “judge’s re-
mark [about the intent of the legislature] is both natural and coher-
ent.”149  This reference is unavoidable because, Solan argues, the 
group adopts the statements of a subgroup, be it a committee or a 
group of members of Congress.150  Members of Congress can have dif-
ferent reasons for supporting the bill as long as they recognize that 
those who developed the legislation had appropriate plans for the 
145 I assume that Congress forms a social group.  See Solan, supra note 27, at  
438-39, for an interesting discussion of how we form perceptions of individuals as 
groups. 
146 Note, for example, the stringent criticism that supervenience without reducibil-
ity has evoked in philosophy of mind.  See Jaegwon Kim, The Myth of Nonreductive Mate-
rialism, in THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM 242, 250-53 (Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka 
eds., 1994) (“[S]upervenience is not going to deliver to us a viable form of nonreduc-
tive materialism . . . .”).  An analogous criticism for collective intention would preclude 
any nonindividualist account. 
147 This argument leaves open two possibilities, which this Comment does not re-
solve:  1) Congress’s intent may be unknowable for pragmatic reasons in many cases, 
and 2) while Congress’s intent does exist, it may be irrelevant for statutory interpreta-
tion. 
148 See Solan, supra note 27, at 444-47, for examples of justifications of legislative 
intent. 
149 Id. at 445. 
150 Id. at 447. 
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bill.151  “All of this means that when judges speak of legislative intent, 
and attribute reasons to the legislature as though it were a single indi-
vidual with a mind of its own, they are simply doing what we all do 
when we talk about deliberative groups.”152  Furthermore, once we be-
gin to treat collective entities as individuals, we will attribute the trait 
of volition to those entities.  It is “common and coherent to under-
stand plural subjects as having beliefs, intentions, and other states of 
mind.”153
Solan has presented a convincing conceptual account.  Surely it is 
true that we (including judges) speak as though Congress were a sin-
gular entity capable of intentions,154 and most of us believe that these 
statements are accurate.  Even textualist judges refer to the intent of 
Congress on occasion, thus recognizing, to some extent, that Congress 
must be an entity with collective intentions.155
The problem, as I see it, is that under this account (and in this re-
gard the account is similar to Gilbert’s) the recognition of collective 
entities may in some cases be wrong.  Even though a certain account 
of group behavior motivates the use of we, does that mean that all fe-
licitous uses of we allow all the same inferences or are there finer dis-
tinctions to be made among different types of groups?  Even if we are 
satisfied with a purely conceptual account (or we believe a conceptual 
account is an ontological account), is it possible that we assume Con-
gress has certain properties making it justifiably conceived of as a plu-
ral subject, when it really does not?  In order to justify inferences from 
the actions of Congress, one must first outline the difficulties the na-
ture of Congress poses to an account of collective intention and see if 
any account of collective intention can support looking to legislative 
intent. If so, what kind of inferences can be justified?  Is Congress ac-
tually enough like an individual (or an undisputed we-subject) to infer 
intentions about the words of a statute?  What about inferring pur-
poses and desires? 
Other legal scholars have used the philosophy of collective inten-
tion.  For example, Anderson and Pildes, in Expressive Theories of Law:  
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 449; see also id. at 449-53 (reviewing the psychological literature explain-
ing why and how we come to attribute states of mind to groups). 
153 Id. at 453. 
154 See, e.g., John Breaux, Congress Is at War with Itself!, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 7, 
2004, at C1 (illustrating the personification of Congress). 
155 See Solan, supra note 27, at 38-44 (demonstrating that even textualists rely on 
the language of intent in their opinions). 
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A General Restatement, use the work of Margaret Gilbert to justify collec-
tive intention; however, they do not apply the theory directly to Con-
gress.156  Sinclair, in Legislative Intent:  Fact or Fabrication?, criticizes 
Eskridge and seems to side with a nonindividualist account of collec-
tive intention.157  Finally, Professor Tiefer uses the work of Austin and 
Searle to account for collective intention.158  While each of these arti-
cles presents interesting analyses of part of the literature, I would like 
to present a broader, more rigorous comparison of the theories of col-
lective intent and their application to Congress. 
B.  What Is Unique About Congress? 
Given that at least one account of collective intention is plausible, 
there are at least some circumstances under which one can accurately 
speak of shared intentions.  What is it about Congress that makes it 
such a challenging case?  First, Congress has unique characteristics as 
a social group:  it has hundreds of members, divided into two houses, 
both of which must approve legislation.159  While only legislators can 
introduce bills, the bills are often drafted in substantial part by the ex-
ecutive branch or private individuals or organizations.160  Most bills 
are then referred to smaller committees in the House of Representa-
tives or the Senate and then reported from the committee.161  These 
committees have a great deal of control over what legislation reaches 
the floor.162
If the bill does not die in committee, a report is sent to the full 
legislative chamber; the committee report contains the background of 
the bill, the bill’s exact language, and an analysis of the bill.163  “Com-
156 Anderson & Pildes, supra note 28, at 1514-24. 
157 Sinclair, supra note 28, at 1351-57.  Note that Sinclair does, at one point, cite 
Bratman.  Id. at 1354. 
158 Tiefer, supra note 28, at 259-64. 
159 See  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:  
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 24 (3d ed. 2001) (describing Con-
gress’s bicameralism and presentment requirements and their effects on the legislative 
process). 
160 Id. at 26. 
161 See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING 15 (2d ed. 2000) (stating 
that in the 104th and 105th Congresses only one in ten bills in the House of Represen-
tatives bypassed a committee); id. at 37 (stating that for the 104th Congress, only one 
in four bills bypassed the Senate committee stage). 
162 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 159, at 28 (“No more than one in ten bills be-
comes law, and most of the unsuccessful proposals are killed in committee.”). 
163 Id. at 30. 
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mittee reports . . . are frequently the only documents that most legisla-
tors and their staffs will read before a vote is taken on the bill.”164  Fol-
lowing the report, informal “postcommittee adjustments” are often 
made.165
Once the report is issued, the bill is placed on a legislative calen-
dar.166  Once the bill is on the agenda, floor consideration occurs.  
While “[f]ew votes appear to be altered by floor debate,” floor consid-
eration also includes the process of amending the bill, which can be 
quite intense for major legislation.167  The amendment process is fre-
quently governed in the House by special rules,168 which can also mod-
ify the order in which bills are presented and the time allowed for de-
bate.169  These rules can be used to “structure the choices members 
confront on the floor in a way that promotes a particular outcome.”170
Similarly, the Senate often operates under “a formal unanimous 
consent agreement (UCA).”171  The UCA limits debate and amend-
ments and may bar nongermane amendments; as the name suggests, 
the support of such a rule must be unanimous.172  After debate and 
amendments, members of Congress vote on the bill.  The entire proc-
ess leading up to the vote has become increasingly less “textbook” 
and, as Barbara Sinclair describes, more “unorthodox”:  “Now varia-
tion is the norm . . . if one route is blocked there is always another to 
try.”173
If the House of Representatives and the Senate vote to approve 
different versions of similar bills, a conference committee is formed.174  
In practice, members of the original committee appoint members to 
this conference committee.175  Following the conference committee, a 
new report is issued that sets forth the propositions agreed to by the 
164 Id. 
165 See SINCLAIR, supra note 161, at 17 (“[M]ore than a third of major legislation 
[is] subject to such postcommittee adjustments in most recent Congresses . . . .”). 
166 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 159, at 31. 
167 Id. at 33-34. 
168 The House and Senate are given this power in the Constitution.  U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its 
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a 
Member.”).  
169 SINCLAIR, supra note 161, at 21. 
170 Id. at 24. 
171 Id. at 45. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 34. 
174 Id. at 57. 
175 Id. at 60. 
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committees.  Both houses then vote to accept or reject the conference 
bill.176  As the reliance on committees both pre- and post-floor consid-
eration suggests, “Congress has a complex and detailed division and 
specialization of labor in which each chamber gives disproportionate 
agenda power to specific subsets of legislators . . . .”177  Thus, only cer-
tain small groups of legislators have positions of great control over the 
content of legislation. 
Second, members of Congress vote on legislation for varying rea-
sons, often having little to do with their careful consideration of the 
issue being legislated.178  These members of Congress may not have 
formed a personal intention that the legislation pass.  In highly con-
troversial cases, many members of Congress vote against the legisla-
tion, thereby evincing their personal intention that the legislation not 
pass.  Furthermore, even members of Congress who vote in favor of 
legislation may have a contrary personal intention that the legislation 
not pass.179  Thus for many reasons, members of Congress may not 
have a personal intention, based on the substance of the statute, that 
the statute be passed.  This calls into question whether Congress as a 
group can be said to have intentions. 
Third, unlike the cooperative participants most often described in 
the literature on collective intention, members of Congress may be 
openly hostile to one another and seek to undermine the success of 
other members’ proposed legislation.180  Furthermore, politically pow-
erful groups in Congress may break Senate or House rules or attach 
measures to bills that cannot be thrown out without grave conse-
quences (e.g., an appropriations bill) in order to force their oppo-
nents to vote in favor of the measures.181
Finally, Congress’s actions are of a unique type.  Congress is not 
simply attempting to bake a cake or run a football play or even dance 
an outdoor ballet.  Congress’s function (at least in the sense relevant 
176 Id. at 57.  Both chambers must approve bills with identical wording.  Id. 
177 Shepsle, supra note 25, at 245. 
178 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 16 (identifying reasons legislators vote for bills, 
such as to support legislation the President, party leaders, or relevant interest groups 
favor). 
179 See, e.g., id. (noting that legislators sometimes vote for a bill because others 
whom they wish to support favor a bill). 
180 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 159, at 34 (describing how members of 
Congress can introduce “killer amendments” which appear friendly but are designed 
to kill the bill by “antagoniz[ing] the bill’s more moderate supporters”). 
181 See, e.g., Edward R. Becker, Of Laws and Sausages, 87 JUDICATURE 7, 9 (2003) 
(providing examples of additions to appropriations bills). 
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here) is as a legislative body:  passing, amending, and rescinding stat-
utes.  A text is created when Congress passes or amends a statute, but 
it is not an ordinary text like a shopping list or essay:  the act of pass-
ing a statute is a “performative utterance” or “performative speech 
act,” that is, one which changes the world in some way.182  For exam-
ple, when an employer says “you’re fired,” she has communicated a 
message, but has also changed the state of the world.  Unless the ut-
terance misfires because she lacks the relevant authority, you are, in 
fact, no longer in her employ.  The same is true for the passing of 
statutes:  meaning and action intertwine.  Congress’s intent, then, is 
what the words convey and that, in turn, changes a state of affairs in 
the world.  The collective intentions we are concerned with are those 
directed at the performative utterance of enacting a statute. 
The text that is passed differs from many other kinds of texts for 
another reason.  In Tiersma’s terms, a statute is a kind of “autono-
mous text.”183  The text has been “textualized” by “a legislature . . . 
empowered to textualize its intentions.”184  This textualization “guar-
antees that the text is not just authoritative, but is the complete expres-
sion of the legal actor’s intent.”185  Tiersma writes that “[s]tatutes are, 
in fact, not unlike messages set adrift in the currents of the ocean,”186 
because “an autonomous text tends to be written so it can be inter-
preted without reference to outside sources—in other words, without 
additional knowledge of who the writer was, the circumstances, or the 
purpose of the writing.  All relevant information, to the extent possi-
ble, is contained in the writing itself.”187  Members of Congress know 
that their statutes are performative acts and that they will be inter-
182 See DENNIS KURZON, IT IS HEREBY PERFORMED . . .:  EXPLORATIONS IN LEGAL 
SPEECH ACTS 5-24 (1986) (analyzing statutes as performative speech acts); Tiefer, supra 
note 28, at 256-57 (discussing Austin’s analysis of speech that has an operative effect).  
For a description of performatives, see generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS 
WITH WORDS 1-11 (1962); GENNARO CHIERCHIA & SALLY MCCONNELL-GINET, MEANING 
AND GRAMMAR 220-39 (2d ed. 2000); John R. Searle, How Performatives Work, in ESSAYS 
IN SPEECH ACT THEORY 85, 85-107 (Daniel Vanderveken & Susamu Kubo eds., 2002).  
Cf. JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING:  STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH 
ACTS 16-20 (1979) (employing an outdated syntactic analysis). 
183 Tiersma, supra note 31, at 482. 
184 Peter M. Tiersma, From Speech to Writing:  Textualization and Its Consequences, in 
LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 349, 360 (Marlyn Robinson ed., 2003). 
185 Id. at 359. 
186 Tiersma, supra note 27, at 433.  Tiersma also includes an interesting history of 
how statutes came to be more autonomous, beginning with medieval judges who 
commonly had no authentic text available to them and felt free to ask members of par-
liament what was meant by a statute.  Id. at 435-43. 
187 Id. at 448. 
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preted without access to each legislator’s state of mind at the time of 
writing; thus, statutes are textualized in Tiersma’s sense. 
C.  Is Congress an Institutional Person? 
To begin the inquiry into the possibility of collective intent on the 
part of Congress, I first begin with the most extreme claim:  that Con-
gress is an institutional person in the sense that Pettit describes.188  
This view does seem to be present in Supreme Court opinions.  For 
example, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Court de-
termined that “Congress intended to exclude tobacco products from 
the FDA’s jurisdiction,” because if Congress had not so intended, the 
FDA would be required to ban them from the market.189  Congress 
had, subsequent to granting jurisdiction to the FDA, demonstrated an 
intent to regulate, instead of ban, tobacco products; the forced with-
drawal of tobacco products from the market would contradict this in-
tent.190  Justice O’Connor looked to the statutes Congress had enacted 
over a thirty-five -year period and concluded that “a specific policy 
embodied in a later federal statute should control our construction of 
the [earlier] statute, even though it ha[s] not been expressly 
amended.”191
This approach to understanding statutory interpretation is per-
fectly reasonable, if one can conceive of Congress as an institutional 
person.  If I say something today that you take to be unclear, but fol-
low up with a more specific statement tomorrow, you are perfectly jus-
tified in seeking to mesh the two statements into one coherent state-
ment because of your expectations about rational individuals.  We 
expect a certain degree of “constancy” and “coherence” in an inten-
tional subject.192  Is this a reasonable expectation for Congress?  I 
think not.193  Pettit himself wonders whether a “Washington-style con-
188 See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text (describing Pettit’s account of 
“purposive groups”). 
189 529 U.S. 120, 140 (2000). 
190 Id. at 143. 
191 Id. at 143 (quoting United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530-31 
(1998) (alterations in original)). 
192 Pettit, supra note 103, at 182. 
193 I argue that we cannot legitimately have these expectations of Congress, even if 
this might lead to a reasonable, or even the best, outcome in a case.  See infra Part IV.F.  
Additionally, note that the majority in Brown & Williamson did not rely solely on this 
argument.  See Brown & Williamson, 524 U.S. at 121 (considering common sense in 
“delegat[ing] a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an admin-
istrative agency”). 
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gress function[s] like a person”194 and notes that “depending on the 
procedures whereby they operate, the members of different organiza-
tional bodies in a state—say, a parliament—may or may not constitute 
institutional persons.”195
Remember that Pettit distinguishes between two types of groups:  
those that must be maximally responsive to their individual members’ 
preferences and those that collectivize rationality and seek some con-
sistency.196  According to Pettit, a group that chooses to reason as a 
collective “will not be an effective or credible promoter of its assumed 
purpose if it tolerates inconsistency or incoherence in its judgments 
across time.”197
In contrast to Pettit’s purposive groups, Congress in our represen-
tational democracy198 is understood to respond maximally to its mem-
bers’ views.199  In a democracy, legislation is passed by majority vote;200 
furthermore, representational democracy requires legislators to be re-
sponsive to their constituency.  A member of Congress should not 
choose to support a policy simply because it is consistent with a past 
policy of a previous Congress.201  Congress’s purpose is not under-
mined by inconsistency over time—legislative enactments may be 
overturned or modified as social and political views evolve. 
Pettit raises one further possibility for groups like Congress.  He 
writes that “an occasionally inconsistent parliament may still function 
as a person as long as there is a second body—say, a review court—
194 Pettit, supra note 137, at 467. 
195 Id. at 464. 
196 Pettit, supra note 103, at 175. 
197 Pettit, supra note 137, at 453. 
198 Pettit’s argument in favor of institutional persons as centers of governance re-
lies on his republican view of government, which, he claims, “argues strongly in favor 
of having institutional persons in charge of political life.”  Id. at 464.  This Comment 
cannot address the merits of republican views of government versus strict democratic 
views, but it is enough, I think, to note that our current understanding of Congress 
does not fully comport with a republican view:  we understand Congress as represent-
ing citizens’ views and we recognize citizens’ power to affect policy by electing or re-
moving members of Congress. 
199 There are, of course, constitutional and other restrictions on Congress’s ac-
tions. 
200 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 159, at 35 (“The number of votes needed to 
adopt an amendment or pass a bill is normally a majority of those voting in each house 
of Congress, assuming a quorum is present.”). 
201 Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 243-44 (1986) (arguing that while judges 
are bound to view law “by a coherent set of principles,” legislatures do not “need rea-
sons of principle to justify the rules it enacts” and are free to “create new rights” as 
guided by a pursuit of good policy). 
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that interprets all legislative acts on the assumption that they are 
meant to be consistent.”202  First, it is arguable that the Court always 
treats Congress’s acts in a way that requires consistency.  Second, 
given that the purpose of this Comment is to determine when and if 
the Court is justified in treating Congress as a social group with inten-
tions or purposes, this definition of institutional person is singularly 
unhelpful.  The argument would run as follows:  “the Court treats 
Congress as an institutional person; therefore, Congress is an institu-
tional person and the Court is justified in treating it as such.”  Thus, it 
seems that Congress cannot meet the criteria set out by Pettit for so-
cial integrates except in a way that begs the question of this Com-
ment.203
D.  Is Congress as an Entity Capable of Shared Intentions? 
Given that Congress cannot be considered an institutional person, 
is it possible, nonetheless, that Congress can be said to have shared in-
tentions?  I believe it can.  I begin by defending my statement in Part 
III.A that the accounts of John R. Searle and Michael Bratman cannot 
provide an adequate account of Congress’s intent.  The shortcoming 
in Searle’s account is that it does not provide the conditions for when 
a person external to the group can properly say that a group has a col-
lective intention.  Because a brain in a vat could believe itself to have a 
collective intention, but be wrong, we need conditions for when a per-
son is right in her beliefs.  Does every participant need to have the 
requisite collective intention?  Do the collective intentions need to be 
identical?  Although Searle notes that in competitive or aggressive 
situations, the participants may only have a higher-order intention to 
cooperate,204 he does not in detail describe, how and to what extent, 
the participants can be said to share an intent.  We must look further 
for the answers to these questions. 
Although Bratman is an individualist and, therefore, believes that 
“I intend that we J” is reducible to individual intentions contra Searle, 
a similar problem appears in his analysis.  Although it is clear in some 
cases that a shared intention exists, it is not clear at what point this 
begins to break down.  Bratman himself recognizes that he is describ-
202 Pettit, supra note 137, at 468. 
203 I am assuming that a social integrate could exist or is, at the very least, a coher-
ent concept. 
204 Searle, supra note 65, at 413-14. 
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ing what may be only one kind of shared intention.205  If our intending 
is dependent on a certain back-and-forth between the individual par-
ticipants,206 it seems that Congress will have trouble meeting this re-
quirement.  Members of Congress who vote against legislation will not 
have expressed their conditional assent to our intending to the par-
ticipants who do so intend.  Perhaps certain subgroups of Congress do 
fit this description, such that one member forms a we-intention on the 
assumption that the other will form one as well, but as a description of 
the entirety of Congress, this view is not tenable. 
Furthermore, Congress fairly clearly fails Bratman’s description of 
full-blown shared cooperative activity.  Bratman presents three crite-
ria:  “mutual responsiveness,” “commitment to the joint activity,” and 
“commitment to mutual support.”207  Members of Congress are not 
generally willing to help all other members of Congress toward a col-
lective goal.  In fact, they may be willing to undermine each other’s 
efforts to achieve what will become the group’s goals.  There may be, 
at best, a tacit acceptance of the legislation passed.  Bratman notes 
that some competitive activity may be something like a shared coop-
erative activity, but only at a very high, general level.  Such an account 
could work for Congress, given that there are some rules to which all 
members abide and work cooperatively toward.  Thus, while Brat-
man’s account cannot, as it stands, adequately describe Congress, an 
account like Bratman’s might be extended to Congress with some ad-
ditions.208
205 See BRATMAN, supra note 73, at 160 (acknowledging the possibility of other 
forms of shared intention, even where “neither agent, strictly speaking, intends the 
shared activity”). 
206 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (describing the web of intentions 
formed as part of the “temporal asymmetry” required for joint intentions). 
207 BRATMAN, supra note 73, at 94-95.  This is simply a different formulation of 
SCA described in Part III.A. 
208 See Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Plans, and Practical Reason, 8 LEGAL THEORY 387, 404-
05 (2002), for an extension of Bratman’s intentional joint activity account to situations 
where an individual or an individual acting in a particular capacity has authority over a 
group.  Shapiro uses this account to argue for legal positivism.  Shapiro relaxes many 
of Bratman’s requirements to account for large groups with central authority.  Id. at 
412-13.  While this account provides an interesting starting point for understanding 
authority in a legal system, it does not seem to readily extend to groups like Congress 
where no central authority figure issues “orders” that require another member to 
“adopt the content of the order as his or her subplan.”  Id. at 406.  As Bratman himself 
summarizes Shapiro’s account:  “We each have intentions that are specifically about 
how certain orders of mine are to give you reasons for action.”  Michael E. Bratman, 
Shapiro on Legal Positivism and Jointly Intentional Activity, 8 LEGAL THEORY 511, 513 
(2002).  Again, members of Congress do not give each other orders that provide rea-
sons for action. 
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Gilbert’s and Tuomela’s accounts are, thus, the most promising.  
Both acknowledge the complications of larger organizations and both 
recognize that smaller groups of an organization may come to repre-
sent the group’s collective intentions.209  One of Gilbert’s primary cri-
teria for a plural subject, and thus shared intention, is that it must be 
possible even where personal intentions are not corresponding.  Thus, 
a member of Congress could have a personal intention quite contrary 
to that of the collective intention, without undermining the collective 
intention as such.210  How is it, though, that a member of Congress 
comes to accept the will of another for the collective will?  What if cer-
tain members still disagree that the intention should be accepted?  
Remember that Tuomela goes a step further, stating that this formula-
tion is “compatible with there being nonoperative members who even 
qua members of G disagree with the . . . goals [intentions] of the op-
erative members.”211
While I think that in principle both Gilbert and Tuomela point to 
the answer—that there is some higher-level or meta agreement or 
joint commitment—only Tuomela discusses the relevant authority sys-
tem and why nonoperative members must be in some sense obliged to 
go along in order for it to be a proper collective intention.212  I there-
fore present my analysis building off the work of Tuomela.213
E.  A Tuomelaic Account 
In Part II.C I discussed, for the most part casually, Tuomela’s 
claims about group intentions and how a group intention might exist 
even in a situation where not all members of a group held the same 
intention, even qua group members.  I now present a modified version 
of Tuomela’s technical requirements for a group intention: 
L is an intended legislative act and intended change in the state of the 
legal world of Congress (G) in the social and normative circumstances C 
209 See GILBERT, supra note 123, at 206 (noting that in situations where not all 
group members are directly involved in decision making, the decisions of a few count 
as the group’s decision); TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 273-74 (same). 
210 See supra notes 178-79 for a description of the circumstances under which 
members of Congress can have a contrary personal intention. 
211 TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 281 (italics added). 
212 Id. 
213 Tuomela’s work may also be preferable because, while compatible with nonin-
dividualism, it does not seem to require it.  The fewer philosophical commitments, the 
better. 
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if and only if in C there are operative members A1. . .An of G in respective 
positions P1. . .Pn such that: 
(1)  L is intentionally jointly accepted as an intention of G by the opera-
tive agents A1. . .An when performing their social tasks in positions 
P1. . .Pn  and due to their exercising the relevant authority system of G; 
(2)  There is a mutual belief among the operative members A1. . .An to 
the effect that (1); 
(3)  Because of (1), the full-fledged nonoperative members of G tend to 
tacitly accept–or at least ought to accept–L as the intention of G, as 
members of G; 
(4)  There is a mutual belief in G to the effect that (3). 
214
Now we can see how this description fits Congress.  When a bill 
comes up for vote, certain members of Congress will vote for a bill and 
others may vote against it.  Only those members of Congress who were 
responsible for the bill’s drafting, were members of the committee 
that prepared the committee report, or have read the committee re-
port thoroughly (perhaps performing their own research) and accept 
it as the group’s intention can be considered “[intention] forming 
operative members,” who have “jointly agreed to adopt the [inten-
tion].”215  These intent-forming operative members are the members 
who must jointly, in the fullest sense, accept the legislation as their 
own intent for the group. 
There may, of course, be very few operative members.  Even if a 
member intended to the fullest extent the bill that passed the House 
or Senate, a conference committee might later call for changes that 
the member only accepts weakly for fear of killing the legislation alto-
gether.  Operative members, therefore, will most often be members of 
the relevant committees or subcommittees, or members of the confer-
ence committee. 
In addition to fully operative members, there are “semi-
nonoperative” members who vote for the bill, but do not play as cen-
tral a role in the legislative process as a committee member might.  
These members can be seen as more than tacitly accepting the inten-
tions of those who formed the bill.  These members sign onto the bill 
and, thus, think it is the proper legislation for Congress to pass for 
whatever reason. 
214 This is drawn from TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 276. 
215 Id.  at 275. 
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Finally, there are the nonoperative members who voted against 
the legislation.  For the legislation to be a group intention under 
Tuomela’s formulation, these members need only tacitly accept the 
legislation as Congress’s intent.  Tacit acceptance means simply that 
“[a] nonoperative member . . . [not] strongly overtly oppose the [in-
tentions] accepted by the operative members, the penalty for disobey-
ing being at least criticizability.”216  Thus, while members of Congress 
may stridently disagree with a piece of legislation as it appears in its 
enacted form, it is outside the bounds of Congress’s structure for a 
member, for example, to forcibly attempt to stop the enactment of a 
piece of legislation (burning every copy of the bill, destroying any 
computer files, etc.). 
Even while disagreeing, a member of Congress is still functioning 
qua group member.  The member must still “intentionally . . . act in a 
way related [to] . . . the group’s realm of concern such that . . . she 
does not violate the group’s central, constitutive goals, beliefs, stan-
dards, and norms.”217  Part of being a member of Congress requires 
adopting the group’s norms and authority structure and agreeing to 
tacitly accept any properly enacted legislation. 
The operative and nonoperative members shift from bill to bill 
and from moment to moment throughout the bill’s journey from in-
troduction to conference committee, as Tuomela recognizes.218  There 
may, of course, be some members of Congress who are most fre-
quently operative members and some who are consistently nonopera-
tive members because of the political make-up of the current Con-
gress.  The key point is that when an individual becomes a member of 
Congress, she accepts the “realm of concern” and relevant authority 
structure of Congress.  She accepts that committees will often have a 
great deal of control over the success and final content of bills and 
that a majority vote will be required for a bill to pass, regardless of 
which side she is on.  She agrees to accept as group intent (that is, the 
intent of Congress) legislation that is properly enacted given the rules 
216 Id. at 282. 
217 TUOMELA, supra note 106, at 100. 
218 See TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 274 (noting that the identity of operative and 
nonoperative members can change between tasks).  Note that those voting against the 
legislation might have jointly accepted a group intention that, because of the structure 
of Congress, the nonoperative members with respect to that intention have no obliga-
tion to accept (because it was not authorized by vote).  Thus, the status of an operative 
member with respect to the legislation is determined once the legislation has been 
passed. 
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and procedures of Congress, including such intricate rules as the 
House’s special rules and the Senate’s UCAs. 
Thus, a member of Congress has a prima facie duty to accept 
these group intentions219 (at least in the weak sense) as long as she is a 
part of Congress; this is central to the long-term functioning of Con-
gress220 and consistent with the structure of Congress as given by Arti-
cle I:  the House and Senate set their own rules and discipline their 
members.221  A member of Congress has agreed to this duty, in the 
sense of accepting a “standing joint intention[] (polic[y]) which [is] 
activated in suitable circumstances but which do[es] not presuppose 
renewed intention-formation or renewed agreement-making.”222
The minority members of Congress have agreed ahead of time to 
“give up their will with respect to group-binding group-[intention] 
formation and transfer that right to the operative members.”223  Con-
gress is, then, a type of “noncooperative joint action” where partici-
pants cooperate only in so much as they fulfill their agreement.224  
Members of Congress do not necessarily help the other members 
more fully realize their personal goals; rather, the “agents act on their 
part-related preferences (utilities).”225
Finally, there are important limitations to this account; for exam-
ple, for a group intention to exist, the operative members must have 
been acting according to the larger structure and authorization of 
Congress, such that their actions oblige a nonoperative member to 
tacitly accept the group’s intentions.  Consider the case of a disagree-
ment over the temperature in the Senate chambers.  It may be the 
case that a special committee has been assigned the task of regulating 
the temperature or a vote might be taken.  While the operative mem-
bers in this case may have the power to change the temperature, I do 
not think the nonoperative members are in any way obliged to tacitly 
accept this as a group intention because it is not closely tied to Con-
219 Note that the duty is to accept them as group intentions, not private intentions.  
See id. at 281 (distinguishing between group intentions accepted because of a duty aris-
ing out of group membership and any personal intentions group members may form). 
220 See id. (describing group members’ acceptance of group intentions as essential 
to the integrity of the group). 
221
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Pro-
ceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of 
two thirds, expel a Member.”). 
222 TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 74. 
223 Id. at 279. 
224 See id. at 149 (describing noncooperative joint action). 
225 Id. 
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gress’s “realm of concern”226 and the agreements a member of Con-
gress makes upon joining Congress.  It is probably unjustified then to 
say that “Congress intended the temperature to be set at seventy de-
grees.” 
Thus, I conclude that Raimo Tuomela’s account, as taken primar-
ily from The Importance of Us,227 can justify understanding Congress as a 
collective entity with group intentions, despite the unique challenges 
that Congress poses to such an account.  A member of Congress 
agrees upon entering Congress that certain members will become op-
erative members depending on the bill in question.  Once that bill is 
passed, even nonoperative members have an obligation to accept, at 
least weakly, that intention as the group’s intention because of the 
relevant authority structure of Congress.  Therefore, under Tuomela’s 
account, Congress can properly be said to have an intention with re-
spect to a particular piece of legislation. 
F.  The Limits of Collective Intention for Congress 
At this point it may seem tempting to declare the problem solved 
and allow all evidence228 of Congress’s intents, wishes, and purposes 
into judges’ reasoning.  I think, however, that such a plan would be 
unwarranted given the limited ways in which Congress functions as a 
collective entity with collective intentions.  As demonstrated above, 
Congress can only be said to have a group or shared intention to the 
extent that, and on such matters as, the nonoperative members have 
some obligation to at least weakly accept the operative members’ 
jointly accepted intention.  What can be said about legislative pur-
pose?229
I think that the use of “Congress’s purpose” in statutory interpre-
tation is not justified by the nature of Congress and the relationship 
among its members.  As discussed above, the use of legislative purpose 
is very attractive in cases where the language of the statute supple-
mented by its context is still inadequate to determine a difficult case.  
Thus, I think and hope other, external justifications may be found for 
reconstructing a likely purpose of Congress or what Congress might 
226 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
227 TUOMELA, supra note 2. 
228 Properly authenticated, subject to whatever restrictions one might devise for 
the authenticity and weight of evidence of Congress’s intents or purposes. 
229 See supra note 42 and accompanying text for my definition of legislative pur-
pose.  Note also that I mean legislative purpose that is not codified in a statute. 
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have had as its purpose were it an individual or a more tightly knit or-
ganization.  My argument is simply that it should be recognized that 
one cannot argue and reason from Congress’s actual purpose because 
Congress is not an entity capable of forming purposes or other more 
elaborate states of mind.  As argued above, it is not an institutional 
person and there are, thus, limitations on what can be ascribed to 
Congress. 
When a member of Congress agrees to at least weakly accept what 
operative members decide is going to be a legislative enactment, she is 
giving her assent to support, at least somewhat, Congress’s action in 
performing a performative speech act.  This performative speech act is 
known to be a highly autonomous, textualized text, in Tiersma’s 
sense.230  As such, the understanding is that all the intent to the high-
est degree possible will be contained in the text since textualization 
“guarantees that the text is not just authoritative, but is the complete 
expression of the legal actor’s intent.”231  No member of Congress can 
be said to have agreed to accept, even weakly, the other purposes, 
hopes or expectations that were floating around among members of 
Congress; thus, Congress as an entity cannot be said to have these 
purposes, hopes, or expectations. 
Why should one adopt such a minimalist picture of congressional 
group structure?  As demonstrated ably by Judge Becker, members of 
Congress cannot always be counted on to follow even their own 
rules.232  A much more elaborate system of norms than is empirically 
verifiable in Congress would be required for Congress to have “pur-
poses.”  Given the evidence of only minimal norms, a theory of legisla-
tive intent succeeds because it requires only very basic commitments 
from each legislator.  In contrast, a theory of legislative purpose re-
quires each legislator to assent to the hopes of other legislators—
something that the nature of Congress’s behavior cannot support. 
Now to return to Hibbs v. Winn.233  In Hibbs, as described in Part 
I.A,234 Arizona law provided a tax credit for contributions to organiza-
tions awarding scholarships to children attending private schools.235  
The tax was challenged on Establishment Clause grounds, and the 
230 See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. 
231 Tiersma, supra note 184, at 359. 
232 See Becker, supra note 181 (lamenting that although Congress has many de-
tailed rules in place, such rules are often ignored). 
233 542 U.S. 88 (2004). 
234 See supra notes 5-14 and accompanying text. 
235 Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 92. 
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state defended by arguing that the TIA barred the taxpayer’s suit in 
federal court.  The majority analyzed the “legislative purpose” behind 
the TIA, while the dissent responded with a textualist argument.236  
Notably, however, the dissent was willing to debate Congress’s pur-
pose, stating that “the TIA’s purpose is not solely to ensure that the 
State’s fisc is not decreased.”237
Thus, my argument is more radical than simply siding with the 
dissent’s views on legislative purpose; both sides of the debate refer to 
congressional purpose as an extant tool.  While the dissent argued 
that legislative purpose may never trump the language of the statute, 
Justice Kennedy made reference to the purpose of the statute as some-
thing in existence.  My conclusion would require judges to be more 
precise because, as I have argued, legislative purpose qua Congress’s 
purpose is not possible given current accounts of collective intention.  
Because no member of Congress can be said to have a prima facie 
duty to accept the purposes or expectations held by the operative 
members of Congress when the legislation in question was enacted, 
inferences about the meaning of a statute based on Congress’s pur-
pose are not justified. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite a close to universal acknowledgment that legislative in-
tent, however narrowly defined, must be used in statutory interpreta-
tion, doubts continually resurface about the nature of Congress as an 
entity capable of collective intentions.  I have argued that there is a 
plausible account of Congress’s intent drawn from work in the field of 
group collective intention.  Such an account of collective intention 
must recognize the complex structure of Congress and the special na-
ture of its activities and communicative acts.  Such an account can be 
found in the work of Raimo Tuomela, as taken primarily from The Im-
portance of Us.238
Under Tuomela’s account, to be a member of Congress an indi-
vidual must agree that when legislation is being written, amended, 
and voted on certain members of Congress will become operative 
members.  Once a bill is passed, even nonoperative members have an 
obligation to accept, at least weakly, that text as the group’s intention; 
236 See id. at 94, 113 (exemplifying the opposing methods of analysis used by the 
majority and the dissent). 
237 Id. at 125 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
238 TUOMELA, supra note 2. 
  
1024 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 983 
 
the minority members of Congress have agreed to “give up their will 
with respect to group-binding group-[intention] formation and trans-
fer that right to the operative members.”239  This account is not de-
feated even though there are “nonoperative members who even qua 
members of [Congress] disagree with the . . . goals of the operative 
members.”240  Therefore, under Tuomela’s account, Congress can 
properly be said to have an intention with respect to a particular piece 
of legislation. 
I have further argued that while legislative purpose is a natural 
tool for determining the scope of statutes, analyses using “legislative 
purpose” must be justified by reasons extrinsic to the legislative proc-
ess and any inferences that might be drawn therefrom.  Because Con-
gress’s status as a complex social group and as an entity communicat-
ing via performative speech acts does not justify conclusions regarding 
its “purpose,” such statutory analyses are mischaracterized. 
As demonstrated through the analysis of Hibbs, courts may find it 
difficult to adopt my argument because reasoning using legislative 
purpose is deeply entrenched.  My argument, however, is not that the 
content of these arguments is necessarily flawed, just that they are mis-
labeled.  One cannot argue and reason from Congress’s actual pur-
pose because Congress is not an entity capable of forming purposes or 
other more elaborate states of mind.  Congress’s existence as a collec-
tive entity depends crucially on the hierarchy of its social organization 
and on the particular kinds of actions that Congress can take.  In its 
legislative function, Congress enacts statutes; therefore, any inferences 
drawn from Congress’s behavior or members’ statements must be 
connected to this particular action.  Members of Congress agree to 
group intentions only insofar as these are tied to Congress’s relevant 
agreed-upon function:  enacting legislation, a performative speech act 
creating autonomous texts. 
 
239 Id. at 279. 
240 Id. at 281. 
